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INTRODUCTION

How best to select judges has been the subject of great debate
ever since the founding of the United States. Over the course of
American history, four basic methods of selection have been tried (with
some variations among them): appointment by elected officials,
partisan election, nonpartisan election, and selection by a technocratic

*
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commission.' The first three methods will be familiar to most readers:
gubernatorial or legislative appointment of judges, contested elections
with party affiliation on the ballot, and contested elections without
party affiliation on the ballot. But readers may be less familiar with the
last method: many states today use unelected commissions often
comprised largely of lawyers selected by the state bar to nominate
judges to the governor, who must appoint one of the commission's
nominees; in many of these states, the judges later run for retention
only in a yes-no referendum with no opponent. 2 Commentators and
scholars have long debated which of these methods creates judiciaries
with, for example, the greatest technical capabilities, the most
independence and accountability, and the widest demographic
diversity. 3
Until an article I published in the Missouri Law Review a few
years ago, 4 however, scholars had never asked whether there are any
ideological consequences to employing one selection method versus
another. Might one method lead to judges who are more liberal or more
conservative than other methods? Might this then lead to decisions
from those courts that are more liberal or conservative than decisions
from courts selected by different methods? In my Missouri Law Review
piece, I hypothesized that one of these methods-selection by a
technocratic commission-might very well create judiciaries that are
systematically more liberal than the others. 5 I gave two reasons for this
hypothesis. First, in many states that use the commission method (also
called the "Missouri Plan," after the first state to adopt it, or "merit
selection," as its proponents like to refer to it), lawyers' organizations
have control (or at least outsized influence) over the commissions. 6

1.
See, e.g., Methods of Judicial Selection: Selection of Judges, NAT'L CTR. FOR ST. CTs.,
(last visited
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial selection/methods/selection .ofjudges.cfn

Oct. 5, 2017) [https://perma.cc/Y5VT-Y2A9] [hereinafter Methods of Judicial Selection] (listing
information on each state's current method for selecting judges compiled by the American
Judicature Society). At the time of the founding, every state selected its judges through executive
or legislative appointment. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Constitutionalityof FederalJurisdictionStripping Legislation and the History of State JudicialSelection and Tenure, 98 VA. L. REV. 839,

855-58 (2012). By the time of the Civil War, however, the vast majority of states had changed their
method of judicial selection to election by the people. See id. at 859-60. Technocratic commissions
became popular in the twentieth century. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Politics of Merit Selection,

74 Mo. L. REV. 675, 677-78 (2009) [hereinafter Fitzpatrick, Merit Selection].
2.
See Fitzpatrick, Merit Selection, supra note 1, at 677-84.
3.

See, e.g., Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Errors, Omissions, and the Tennessee Plan, 39 U. MEM. L.

REV. 85, 115-23 (2008) (reciting studies).
4.

Fitzpatrick, Merit Selection, supra note 1.

5.
6.

See id. at 691.
See id. at 679.
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Lawyers as a group are more liberal than the public at large, 7 and, I
suggested, because those who select judges probably care about the
decisions those judges will reach and know those decisions are
correlated with the judges' own ideological preferences, 8 these lawyerheavy commissions might very well pick more liberal judges than the
public or an elected official might have picked. 9 Second, I thought that,
even if the commissions put aside all considerations of how they hope
judges will decide cases, the use of commissions might still have
ideological consequences because, again, lawyers are thought to be
more liberal than average, and picking judges from their lot without
regard to their ideological preferences might skew judiciaries to the left
so long as governors and the public do not put such considerations to
the side. 10 At the time I published my Missouri Law Review piece there
was, frankly, not very good evidence that lawyers were more liberal
than the general population (even though it was conventional
wisdom)," but the conventional wisdom has now been bolstered by a
rigorous paper by Adam Bonica, Adam Chilton, and Maya Sen. 12 They
ran the Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory in 2012 through the
databases on campaign contributions and found that "American
lawyers lean to the left of the ideological spectrum." 13
In my article, I looked at two states that used the commission
method and compared the ideological preferences of the judges proposed
by the commissions to the ideological preferences of the public in those

7.

See id. at 691.

8.
See id. at 687-88 ("This correlation has been demonstrated over many years by both
political scientists and legal scholars.").

9.
See id. at 686-90.
10. See id. at 690 (noting that "a method of selection that does not select for ideology may
simply replicate the distribution of ideological preferences within the bar" and that if that
distribution "differs from the distribution among the public, then we would still expect to see the
same shift in the ideological direction of the judiciary toward the preferences of lawyers and away
from the preferences of the public" (emphasis omitted)). Other scholars have now echoed my
theory. See Adam Bonica & Maya Sen, The Politics of Selecting the Bench from the Bar: The Legal
Profession and PartisanIncentives to Politicize the Judiciary2 (Harvard Kennedy Sch., Working

Paper No. RWP15-001, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2577378 [https://perma.cc/SZ4U-LGQK]
("Left to a judicial selection method devoid of ideological considerations, America's courts should,
after controlling for relevant demographic characteristics, closely resemble the population of
attorneys from which they are drawn."); id. at 4 ("Under such minimal politicization, a liberal skew
in the preferences of attorneys would result in a judiciary that more closely resembles the
preferences of Democrats. In effect, any liberal bias in the attorney pool gives Democrats an
advantage in control over the judiciary." (emphasis omitted)).
11.
12.

See Fitzpatrick, Merit Selection, supra note 1, at 691.
Adam Bonica et al., The Political Ideologies of American Lawyers, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS

277 (2016).
13. Id. at 292.
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states. 14 1 found, using common proxies for ideological preferences, that
the judges proposed by commissions in those states did appear to be
quite a bit more to the left than the public at large was in those states.1 5
The study I published in the Missouri Law Review had several
limitations. One was that the study looked at all the judges proposed by
the commissions rather than the judges who ultimately took the
bench. 16 Another was that the study looked at only two states; I could
not know whether the same findings would be found in other states that
use the commission method, nor could I know whether the judges in
states that use other methods would look any different. 17
This study seeks to overcome some of the limitations in my
Missouri Law Review piece. It is a systematic investigation of the
ideological preferences of appellate judges in all fifty states over a
twenty-year period (1990-2010). The goal of this study is to assess
whether certain methods of selection have resulted in judiciaries that
skew to the left or right compared with the public at large in those
states. My main hypothesis is that the commission method and
nonpartisan elections will show a leftward skew in the judiciary, but
the other methods will show no skew. I include in these other "no-skew"
methods the commission method where the commission serves only at
the pleasure of the governor; I predict this method will behave more like
gubernatorial appointment because the governor can eliminate the
commission at any time. I explained above why I think the
nongubernatorial commission states will skew left. I predict
nonpartisan elections will skew left for one of the same reasons: because
nonpartisan elections remove identifiers on the ballot, the public will be
unable to select for ideology very effectively, leaving them to pick from
a lot of candidates (lawyers) who are already left-leaning. As in my
study in the Missouri Law Review, I seek to assess the ideological
preferences of state appellate judges here by using a common proxy for
these preferences: whether the judge exhibits more affiliation with the
Republican or Democratic Party. In particular, I examine whether a
judge gave more campaign contributions to Democratic or Republican
14. The states examined were Missouri and Tennessee. See Fitzpatrick, Merit Selection,
supra note 1, at 692.

15.

See id. at 693-94, 696 (finding that "although 67% of the merit nominees in

Tennessee . . voted more often in Democratic Party primaries, only 51% of the votes for the
state House and only 49% of the votes for Tennessee's federal House seats were for
Democratic candidates," and that "87% [of nominees in Missouri] gave more [campaign
contributions] to Democrats than Republicans [even though] Democratic candidates in
Missouri only received roughly 50% of the general election votes in state and federal House
races").

16.
17.

See id. at 701.
See id. at 700-01.
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candidates for public office, whether the judge was registered to vote as
a Democrat or a Republican, and whether the judge voted more often in
Democratic primaries or Republican primaries. 18 My findings are these:

>
>
>
>
>

In all three judicial selection taxonomies examined in this
study, the ideological skew was smaller (or even nonexistent)
in states that use appointment or partisan elections than in
states that use commissions or nonpartisan elections.
To the extent there was ideological skew in a state, it was
almost always to the left.
The magnitude of skew in commission states appeared to
vary in binary rather than continuous fashion based on the
amount of control the legal profession had over the
commissions in those states.
Skew was not reduced in commission states where the
commissions served at the pleasure of the governor rather
than by law.
Although it was not one of the principal inquiries in the
study, judges selected by the commission and appointment
methods were less likely to give campaign contributions to
Democratic and Republican candidates for public office than
judges selected by either partisan or nonpartisan elections.

It should be noted that it was beyond the scope of this project to
test these findings for statistical significance; that will have to await
further study. Nonetheless, these findings appear mostly consistent
with my hypotheses. First, ideological skew was both leftward and more
significant in commission and nonpartisan election states. The skew
was smaller or nonexistent in states that use appointment or partisan
elections. (To the extent it existed, the skew in partisan election states
was often also leftward; in appointment states it was often rightward
but small.) Second, ideological skew appeared to be influenced by the
control exercised by the bar in commission states, but the influence did
not grow as the number of seats increased; the influence was found as
soon as the bar controlled any seats on the commission. Third, however,
states with commissions that served only at the pleasure of the
governor behaved more like states with commissions that served by law
than (as I had predicted) like states using the gubernatorial
appointment method.

18. See, e.g., Adam S. Chilton & Eric A. Posner, An Empirical Study of PoliticalBias in Legal
Scholarship, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 277, 280 (2015) ("[D]onations are a widely used proxy for ideology
in empirical research.").
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In the Parts below, I describe in more detail the methodology
behind this study, my results, and the conclusions I have drawn.
I. METHODOLOGY

This study compares the ideological makeup of the judiciary in
each of the fifty states to the ideological makeup of the people of those
states. I began with a list of appellate judges who served in each state
from January 1, 1990, to December 31, 2010. Appellate judges were
selected because it is thought that ideology plays a bigger role in
appellate decisionmaking than it does in trial decisionmaking; this is
the case because it is thought that the law is more ambiguous in the
few cases that are appealed from trial courts than in all the cases that
are filed there in the first instance. 19 That is, I selected the judges for
whom any ideological skew in the judiciary would be most relevant. I
selected the time period from 1990 to 2010 because it would allow for a
great deal of data to be collected in each state, yet the period would not
be so long ago that the data would be hard to find. For each of the judges
on the list, I then collected information on a common proxy for their
ideological preferences: whether they exhibited greater affiliation with
the Democratic Party (left or liberal preferences) or Republican Party
(right or conservative preferences). In particular, to the extent it was
available, I collected data on three sorts of affiliation with a political
party: (1) whether the judge has given more campaign contributions to
candidates for public office from the Democratic or Republican Party,
(2) whether the judge was registered to vote as a Democrat or a
Republican, and (3) whether the judge voted more often in Democratic
or Republican primaries. To the extent it was available, this data was
used to assign an affiliation of Democrat or Republican for each judge
in each state on the list. These assignments were then used to establish
the relative shares of Democratic and Republican appellate judges who
served in each state from 1990 to 2010. These relative shares were then
compared with the relative shares of Democrats and Republicans in the
populace in each state, as measured by the relative share of the vote in
state House of Representatives and federal House of Representatives
elections from 1990 to 2010 that went to candidates from the
Democratic and the Republican Parties. I then calculated whether there
was any difference between the appellate judges and the public in each
state, how large the difference was, and the average of the differences

19.

See, e.g., Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their

Fee Awards, 7 J. E1PIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 840 (2010) (reciting studies).
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in the states that used the same method of selection. I describe each
step of this methodology in more detail below.
A. The List of Appellate Judges in Each State
Surprisingly, one of the most difficult challenges of this project
was to identify who served as an appellate judge in each of the states
between January 1, 1990, and December 31, 2010. One would think the
states would keep records of such important public officials, but, in fact,
the recordkeeping was very uneven. Some states publish "blue books"
with lists of public officials who serve each year, but many states do not,
and even when they do, the books often do not contain sufficient
biographical information to aid in the acquisition of the necessary party
affiliation data. There is also a private directory of state (and federal)
judges published every year by Forster-Long called The American
Bench.20 But we found that this source, too, was incomplete.
Accordingly, we supplemented these sources with many others: the
reporters of judicial opinions in many states list the judges who served
during the time period covered by each volume; LexisNexis and
Westlaw searches; searches on Google and other internet engines. Two
teams of researchers independently compiled the judges in each state,
and I combined the results into the most inclusive possible list in each
state. I combined the lists from the independent teams on the belief that
it was much more likely that the researchers would miss the name of
someone who had served as a judge than it was that they would
erroneously include the name of someone who had not served as a judge.
All told, we found 3,386 appellate judges between 1990 and 2010.
B. The IdeologicalPreferences of the Judges
To capture the ideological preferences of each appellate judge, I
collected information on a proxy for ideological preference commonly
used in the legal and political science literature: whether the judge
exhibited greater affiliation with the Democratic Party (left or liberal
preferences) or Republican Party (right or conservative preferences).2 1
In particular, to the extent it was available, I collected data on three
sorts of affiliation with a political party: (1) whether the judge has given
more campaign contributions to candidates for public office from the
Democratic or Republican Party, (2) whether the judge was registered
20.

See

The

American

Bench,

FORSTER-LONG,

LLC,

https://www.forster-long.com/

americanbench (last visited Oct. 3, 2017) [https://perma.cc/FV83-K4D2].
21. See Fitzpatrick, Merit Selection, supra note 1, at 692 (reciting studies).
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to vote as a Democrat or Republican, and (3) whether the judge voted
more often in Democratic or Republican primaries.
Unfortunately, the latter two measures of party affiliationregistration and primary voting-are not available in all states. Some
states do not record this data, some states do not register voters by
party, and in some states it was too expensive to obtain this data. Thus,
the cornerstone of this study is the first measure: the campaign
contributions the judges have made. In order to find contributions to
federal candidates, I searched the Federal Election Commission
website.2 2 In order to find contributions to state candidates, I searched
the Follow the Money website, 23 and, when it was not comprehensive
back to 1990 for a particular state, 24 I searched state-specific databases
as well.2 5 Because certain names are common in some states, other
biographical information (such as age or city of residence) was used to
confirm contributions whenever possible. I counted any contributions to
candidates running for office as a member of one of the two parties, as
well as contributions to organizations clearly affiliated with one of these
parties. 2 6 Judges who gave more to Democratic candidates and
organizations were then marked "Democrat," and judges who gave more
to Republican candidates and organizations were marked "Republican."
Where there were no contributions, the contributions were only to
unaffiliated candidates or third parties, or the contributions were
evenly divided between the parties, the judge was marked as
"Unknown." As I did when I compiled the lists of appellate judges, I
collected the campaign contribution data with two independent teams
of researchers. In the case of discrepancies between the two collections,
a third researcher would double check the sources and resolve the
discrepancy. If uncertainty persisted (because, for example, there was
not enough biographical information to confirm whether the campaign
contributor and the judge were indeed the same person), the
contribution was included (a choice I see as an arbitrary one).

22. Transaction Query by Individual Contributor, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION,
http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/norindsea.shtml (last visited Oct. 5, 2017) [https://perma.cc/

53N7-7FLX].
23.

FOLLOW

THE MONEY,

http://www.followthemoney.org/

(last visited

Oct.

5,

2017)

[https://perma.cc/H4SR-HJZY].
2 4. Id.
25. Sites for State Races: Data Sources, Specific State Sites, CAMPAIGN FIN. INFO. CTR.,
http://www.campaignfinance.org/linksstate.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2017) [https://perma.cc/

UK25-K7B5].
26. Examples of these organizations include the Republican and Democratic state and
national executive committees.
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In light of the fact that the other measures of party affiliation
were not available in every state, I would have liked to stop with
campaign contributions, but the number of judges with "Unknown"
affiliation after tallying the campaign contributions was quite large, as
I show in the Appendix. Thus, I decided to add the remaining measures
of party affiliation in states where they were available.2 7 But because
this means that different party affiliation metrics are used in different
states, I report my results below both ways: with only the campaign
contribution data and with all three sources of data (campaign
contributions, party registration, and primary voting). As I show, the
results were not appreciably different.
With respect to party registration, data was available at a
reasonable price in twenty-two states: Alaska, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Nevada, New Jersey,
New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and West
Virginia. With respect to primary voting, data was available in one
other state: Tennessee. Again, because certain names are common in
some states, other biographical information about the judge (such as
age, birth date, birth place, and middle name) was used to confirm his
or her identity in these records whenever possible. The registration
data usually only recorded for which political party the judge was
currently registered, so I used only current registrations in this study.
The primary data usually recorded the last several primaries in which
the judge had voted, so I recorded in which party's primary the judge
voted more often. Again, all of this data was collected twice by two
independent research teams, and discrepancies were resolved by a third
team that reexamined the aforementioned sources. The data was
overlaid on the campaign contribution data in the following way: When
this data agreed with the campaign contribution data-because the
judge was currently registered or had voted more often in primaries of
the same party to which the judge had given more campaign
contributions-then the judge's designation as a "Democrat" or
"Republican" did not change. When this data disagreed-because the
judge was currently registered with or had voted more often in
primaries of the other party-then the judge's designation was changed
to "Unknown." When this data filled a gap-because the judge had been

27. This, again, is a common technique to bridge gaps in political donations. See, e.g., Chilton
& Posner, supra note 18, at 291-92 ("One shortcoming of using political donations as a proxy for
ideology is that not everyone makes campaign contributions.... It is likely that most nondonors
have political commitments, and as a result we decided to . . . code their ideology using information
available on their curriculum vitae (CVs).").
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designated "Unknown" from the campaign contribution data-then the
judge's designation was changed to that for whichever party he was
currently registered or had voted in more primaries. The addition of the
registration and primary data reduced the number of unknowns
considerably in states where it was available.

C. The IdeologicalPreferences of the Public
To determine the ideological preferences of the public in each
state, I gathered two sources of data: the general election returns for
the federal House of Representatives and the general election returns
for the state House of Representatives (or its equivalent) for each
general election from January 1, 1990, to December 31, 2010. I used
both federal and state returns because a given political party may be
branded entirely differently at the state and federal levels within any
particular state, and, for this reason, I wanted to report my results
using both baselines. The federal returns were gathered from the
website of the Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives. 2 8 The state
returns were usually collected from the Secretary of State's website in
each state. However, this data was incomplete because many of the
state websites failed to go back as far as 1990. Thus, this data was
supplemented by an academic study that had already gathered all of
the same state returns. 29 These two sources made the state returns
complete with the exception of the 1990 election in North Carolina,
which is missing returns from several areas of the state. As such, the
1990 election in North Carolina was omitted from my analysis. In all
the states, only the votes for Republican and Democratic candidates
were recorded; the votes for other parties and independents were
omitted. Again, all of this data was collected twice by two independent
research teams, and discrepancies were resolved by a third team that
reexamined the aforementioned sources. In each state, the percentage
of the vote for each party was averaged over all the elections during this
time period to arrive at the public's ideological baselines.

28.

Election

Statistics,

1920

to

Present,

U.S.

HOUSE

OF

REPRESENTATIVES,

http://history.house.gov/Institution/Election-Statistics/Election-Statistics/
(last visited Oct. 5,
2017) [https://perma.cc/C46H-9C2R].
29. Carl Klarner et al., State Legislative Election Returns (1967-2010) (Jan. 11, 2013) (Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research, ICPSR34297-vl) (unpublished dataset
containing

state

house

election

returns),

studies/34297 [https://perma.cc/6P8N-3ADF].

http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/
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D. MeasuringIdeological Skew in the Judiciaries
In order to assess whether the judiciaries in each state were
more left-leaning or right-leaning than the people in their states, I
made three comparisons: (1) of the judges with a known party
affiliation, the percentage designated Republican using only campaign
contribution data to the percentage of votes the public in those states
gave to Republican federal and state house candidates; (2) of the judges
with a known party affiliation, the percentage designated Republican
using all data to the percentage of votes the public in those states gave
to Republican federal and state house candidates; and (3) the
percentage of the total contributions made by judges that went to
Republican candidates to the percentage of votes the public in those
states gave to Republican federal and state house candidates. In each
of these comparisons, the second percentage was subtracted from the
first. Thus, a positive number shows rightward skew in the judiciary
and a negative number leftward skew.
E. Averaging Ideological Skew over States with the Same Selection
Methods
In order to compare how ideological skew varied by selection
method, I averaged the skews found in the states that used the same
method. Unfortunately, although the states basically use only four
methods of judicial selection, there are some variations among them,
and there is no generally accepted taxonomy of state selection
methods. 30 Thus, I report my results using three different taxonomies.
(See Table 1 in the Appendix, in which each state is listed along with
its classification in each taxonomy.) First, I use the taxonomy created
by the American Judicature Society ("AJS"). 31 The AJS divides the
states into five groups: Gubernatorial Appointment, Legislative
Appointment, Merit Selection, Nonpartisan Election, and Partisan
Election. (As I show in the results section, in order to test my
mechanism hypothesis, I further sorted the Merit Selection states by
the amount of influence the bar had over the commission. 32) The AJS
30. Further complicating matters, many judges are
interim basis via a selection method (often gubernatorial
method used to fill full terms. It is beyond the scope of this
differences. Over time, even judges selected differently on
state's full-term method. As a result, I characterize states

initially appointed to the bench on an
appointment) that is different from the
study to assess the significance of these
an interim basis become folded into the
only by the method of selection used to

fill full terms on the bench.
31.

Methods of JudicialSelection, supra note 1.

32. See Fitzpatrick, Merit Selection, supra note 1, at 680-81, for charts on the bar's influence
over the commission in each of these states.
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taxonomy is perhaps the best-known taxonomy, but, in my experience,
some have believed it overclassifies states as commission states. In
order to provide balance, I also use a competing taxonomy created by
the Federalist Society for Law & Public Policy Studies; in my
experience, some have believed the Federalist Society underclassifies
states as commission states. The Federalist Society also divides the
states into five groups: Appointment, Nonpartisan Election, Partisan
Election, Hybrid, and Missouri Plan. 33 Finally, I use my own taxonomy,
which I hope observers will see as both evenhanded as well as suited to
test another of my hypotheses (i.e., the one about commissions that
serve at the pleasure of the Governor): Appointment, Gubernatorial
Commission, Commission, Nonpartisan Elections, and Partisan
Elections. My taxonomy is much like the AJS taxonomy except that (1)
I combine the gubernatorial and legislative appointment states into one
category (because they are all officials elected by the public) and (2) I
divide the AJS's Merit Selection states into two groups: Gubernatorial
Commission states, where the selection commission exists only by
executive order and therefore only by the continued grace of the
Governor, and Commission states, where the selection commissions
exist by law. 34 One note: two states (Arkansas and Mississippi) changed
from partisan to nonpartisan elections during the period I examined in
this study; as a result, I treat these states before and after the change
as separate entities (i.e., Arkansas before 2000 and Arkansas after

2000; Mississippibefore 1994 and Mississippi after 1994).
II. RESULTS
Table 1 in the Appendix reports the complete results of this
study organized by state. Tables 2-4 in the Appendix report those
results organized by states that use the same method of judicial
selection for each of the three selection taxonomies discussed above.
In order to make these results more accessible to readers, I
graph some of them in Figures 1-5, below. Figure 1 depicts column 5
from Table 1 in the Appendix: the percentage of judges with known
campaign contribution affiliations who lean Republican compared to
the percentage of votes the electorate in each state gave to Republican
federal house candidates. Figure 2 depicts column 6 from Table 1: the
percentage of judges with known campaign contribution affiliations

33. Federalist Soc'y, ST. CTs. GUIDE, http://www.statecourtsguide.com/ (last visited Oct. 5,
2017) [https://perma.cc/R9HG-7NSG].
34. In the Gubernatorial Commission category, I placed Delaware, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, and New Hampshire. See Methods of JudicialSelection, supra note 1.
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who lean Republican compared to the percentage of votes the electorate
in each state gave to Republican state house candidates. In all of the
figures, the electorate's percentage was subtracted from the judges'
percentage. Thus, a positive number shows rightward skew in the
judiciary and a negative number leftward skew. For example, the
appellate judges in California have been only slightly more Republican
than the public has been over the last twenty years as measured by
either federal house elections (2.68% more Republican in Figure 1) or
state house elections (1.27% more Republican in Figure 2).
Figures 3-5 depict columns 2 and 3 from Tables 2-4 in the
Appendix: the average skew in states with the same method of judicial
selection, with one figure for each judicial selection taxonomy (i.e., AJS,
Federalist Society, and my taxonomy). For example, the judges in the
AJS's merit selection states were on average 16% more Democrat than
the public in those states as measured by their federal house votes and
14.6% more Democrat than the public as measured by their state house
votes (see Figure 3).35

35. Note: because there are only two gubernatorial appointment and two legislative
appointment states in the AJS taxonomy, I grouped all four states together into one "appointment"
category.
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FIGURE 1: STATE APPELLATE JUDGES VERSUS THE FEDERAL
ELECTORATE IN THEIR STATE, 1990-2010
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2: STATE APPELLATE JUDGES VERSUS THE STATE ELECTORATE
IN THEIR STATE, 1990-2010
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3: STATE APPELLATE JUDGES VERSUS ELECTORATES BY AJS
SELECTION METHOD, 1990-2010
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FIGURE 4: STATE APPELLATE JUDGES VERSUS ELECTORATES BY
FEDERALIST SOCIETY SELECTION METHOD, 1990-2010
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5: STATE APPELLATE JUDGES VERSUS ELECTORATES BY
FITZPATRICK SELECTION METHOD, 1990-2010
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III. DISCUSSION
My results are noteworthy in several respects. First, as all of the
negative numbers in Table 1 in the Appendix show, most states
exhibited a leftward skew in their judiciaries. Roughly forty states show
a leftward skew on every metric. It rarely matters whether the
comparison is to federal house election returns (columns 5, 8, and 11)
or state house election returns (columns 6, 9, and 12): the judiciaries in
most states appear to be more liberal than the public in their states. It
also rarely matters whether the comparison included only campaign
contribution data (columns 5, 6, 11, and 12) or party registration and
primary voting data as well (columns 8 and 9): although the number of
judges with unknown affiliations often went down in states where the
additional data was available, it usually did not make much of an
impact on the magnitude of the ideological skew. It makes more of a
difference whether the comparison is made to the percentage of judges
who are designated Republican or to the percentage of their
contributions that go to Republicans. The comparison that looks at the
money (columns 11 and 12) as opposed to the judges is noisiersometimes exacerbating the ideological skew I found from looking at the
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judges and sometimes counteracting it. In every case, however, the vast
majority of states still exhibit a leftward skew. It is true that in many
states the percentage of judges with unknown affiliation is high, and, if
those judges have significantly different ideological preferences than
the judges with known affiliations, then the picture painted by my
results would not be accurate. However, I know of no reason why the
judges who did not make any campaign contributions are, for example,
more likely to be right-leaning than the judges who did. Indeed, again,
when the voter registration and primary voting data were collected in
the states where it was available, it largely confirmed the campaign
contribution data. My finding here is also consistent with the BonicaSen study, which found that judges were to the left of elected officials
in all but four states. 36 Bonica and Sen also employed a statistical device
to correct for the possibility that nondonors differed from donors; they
concluded that their results were "substantively identical" with and
without the correction, lending support to the notion that, if we could
observe the nondonor population, the results would not look much
different than those I present here. 37
Second, the leftward skews were often quite large-frequently
in the double digits-whereas, in the few states with rightward skews,
the skew was usually very small (with Virginia the most notable
exception). Indeed, the average leftward skew was approximately twice
as large as the average rightward skew. 38 This, too, is consistent with
the Bonica-Sen study, which found small gaps when judges were to the
right of public officials but often very large ones when judges were to
the left. 39
Third, there may very well be a relationship between the method
of selection and ideological skew. As Figures 3-5 and Tables 2-4 in the
Appendix show, in every taxonomy, the skew was larger and more to the
left in states that use the commission method (referred to as "Merit
Selection," "Missouri Plan," or the "Commission Method" in the various

36. See Bonica & Sen, supra note 10, at 23 fig.6 (comparing ideology of judges, politicians,
and attorneys). The Bonica-Sen study relied exclusively on the Martindale-HubbellLaw Directory
to find judges.
37. See id. at 10-12 (employing a Heckman correction).
38. Based only on contribution data, the average rightward skew was 9.51% against the
federal electorate and 11.64% against the state electorate, whereas the average leftward skews
were 20.21% and 18.45%, respectively. Based on contribution, registration, and primary voting
data, the corresponding average rightward skews were 9.66% and 11.98%, whereas the average
leftward skews were 19.52% and 17.82%. Based on the data for magnitude of contributions, the
corresponding average rightward skews were 13.07% and 17.38%, whereas the average leftward
skews were 30.19% and 25.87%.
39. See Bonica & Sen, supra note 10, at 23 fig.6 (comparing ideology of judges, politicians,
and attorneys).
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taxonomies) and nonpartisan elections than in states that used
appointment and partisan elections. Although there is some skew in the
other states as well, it is smaller or even nonexistent in some
taxonomies. This is consistent with my hypothesis that commission and
nonpartisan election states would show a leftward skew that
appointment and partisan election states do not. Again, my results here
are consistent with the Bonica-Sen study, which found that judges
selected by the commission method or nonpartisan elections more
closely reflected the ideological makeup of the lawyer population than
judges selected by appointment or partisan elections. 40 It is surprising
to me, however, that partisan-election states exhibited a larger (and a
left-leaning) skew than the appointment states. My best hypothesis for
this result is that, in many partisan-election states, interim vacancies
are filled with the commission method. Thus, many of the judges on the
appellate benches in partisan-election states got there through the
commission method, not partisan elections (though they might
eventually retain their seats in partisan elections). This might explain
why the partisan-election skew falls in between zero skew and the
leftward skew exhibited in commission states.
Fourth, as Table 2 in the Appendix shows, there does appear to
be a relationship between the amount of influence the bar exhibits and
the magnitude of the leftward skew, but the relationship is binary as
opposed to continuous. That is, the leftward skew increased based on
whether or not there were any bar seats on the commissions; the skew
did not continue to grow as the number of such seats increased. As such,
this is only somewhat consistent with my hypothesis that, the greater
the bar's control of the commission, the more liberal the judges in those
states would be. It may be the case that the bar's representatives on
these commissions are so persuasive that one is all the bar needs to
exert its influence. (The amount of bar influence did have a more
continuous effect on the magnitude of leftward skew as measured by
total campaign contributions.)
Fifth, as Figure 5 and Table 4 in the Appendix show, the
leftward skew in commission states was not reduced when the
commissions served only at the pleasure of the governor (in fact, it was
somewhat increased). I had predicted that these commission states
would behave more like gubernatorial appointment states because, if
the governor did not like the commission in his or her state, he or she
could simply eliminate it. But this was not the case. It may be that, even
when a commission is established only by executive order, political

40.

See id. at 24-27.
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norms make it just as difficult to revoke the commission as one created
by law.
Finally, it shouldbe noted that judges in states that use partisan
and nonpartisan elections tend to make campaign contributions more
often than judges in states that use other methods. As Table 1 in the
Appendix shows, the number of judges who did not make campaign
contributions averaged 60% in commission and appointment states, but
dropped to 40% and 30% in nonpartisan- and partisan-election states,
respectively. Part of the explanation for this may be that some of the
commission states prohibit such contributions in their codes of judicial
ethics. But, regardless, this finding may be of interest to commentators
who seek methods of selection that minimize the amount of politicking
in the judiciary. 41
It should be emphasized that this study has a number of
limitations. First, as I noted, it was beyond the scope of this study to
bring to bear statistical tools to test the significance of the differences I
find here. Thus, it is possible that none of the differences I report are
statistically significant. Second, in many states, many of the judges'
ideological affiliations are unknown due to lack of data. Although there
is no reason to think the unknown judges have different ideological
preferences than the known judges, if they are significantly different,
then the results I found here would not be accurate. It should be noted,
however, that neither of these limitations is found in the Bonica-Sen
study, and, as I have said, that study found similar results to this one.
CONCLUSION

In this study I have tried to shed light on an unexplored question
in the vast literature on judicial selection: do some methods more than
others lead to an ideological dissonance between the judiciary and the
public? I hypothesized that two methods of selection-technocratic
commissions (when the commissions did not serve at the pleasure of the
governor) and nonpartisan elections-would exhibit a leftward skew
that the other methods-appointment by elected officials, gubernatorial
commissions, and partisan elections-would not. My results are mostly
consistent with this hypothesis, with the major exception of my
prediction about states with commissions that serve at the pleasure of
the governor: these states were just as skewed to the left as other
commission states (if not more so). I also hypothesized two possible
mechanisms for this skew: (1) the control that the left-leaning legal

41. See Fitzpatrick,
commentators).

Merit Selection, supra note

1,

at 685 n.32

(discussing these
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profession has over the commissions in many states and (2) the barriers
that the commission method and nonpartisan elections place in the
path of filtering the left-leaning pool of candidates for judicial office
(lawyers) by ideology. My results are consistent with these mechanisms,
but it appears that the first mechanism may not depend on the bar
exhibiting majority control over commissions; rather, it may be that
reserving even one seat for the bar leads to the same leftward influence
as reserving several seats.

1750

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:6:1729

APPENDIX

Table 1 reports the complete results of this study organized by
state. Reading left to right, the Table lists each state, how the state is
classified in each of the three selection taxonomies (designated "AJS"
for American Judicature Society, "FS" for the Federalist Society, and
"BF" for my own), and then the three different measures of ideological
skew in the judiciary in that state. Again, the first measure (columns
5-7) compares the percentage of judges in each state from 1990-2010
who were designated as Republican as opposed to Democrat based on
the campaign contribution data with the percentage of the vote
Republican as opposed to Democratic candidates took from the public
in house races over the same time period. Column 5 subtracts the
percentage of Republican votes in federal races from the percentage of
judges who are designated Republican; a positive differential means the
judges leaned more Republican than the public did, and a negative
differential means the judges leaned more Democrat than the public
did. Column 6 is the same calculation but uses state house races instead
of federal house races. Column 7 is the percentage of judges in each
state who were excluded from the calculations in columns 5 and 6
because no party affiliation could be designated for them (because, for
example, they gave no campaign contributions or gave contributions in
equal amounts to candidates of both parties). For example, the
appellate judges in California have been only slightly more Republican
than the public has been over the last twenty years as measured by
federal house elections-a mere 2.68%-but some 46.58% of judges
have no known affiliation based on campaign contributions alone.
The second measure (columns 8-10) is the same as the first,
except the percentage of judges who were designated as Republican as
opposed to Democrat is based not only on campaign contribution data,
but, in the states included in these columns, party registration and
primary voting data as well. (The states left blank in the second
measure did not make available party registration or primary voting
data.) As is evident from column 10, including these other data sources
reduced the percentage of judges with unknown party affiliation
considerably. For example, the percentage of judges in New Jersey with
unknown affiliation went from 71.79% to 21.37% after these other data
sources were added to the campaign contribution data.
The third measure (columns 11 and 12) is the same as the first
except that, instead of using the percentage of judges who were
Republican or Democrat, I used the percentage of the judges' campaign
contributions that went to Republicans as opposed to Democrats. In
some states, looking at the relative magnitude of the contributions
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results in a significantly different skew than looking at the number of
judges who gave more money to one party than the other. For example,
the leftward skew in South Carolina was only 9.85% (versus the state
electorate) and 13.16% (versus the federal electorate) when the
comparison is with how many judges have given more to one party or
the other; it increases to 32.30% (for state elections) and 35.61% (for
federal elections) when the comparison is with how much money judges
have given to one party or the other.
Tables 2-4 show the average of all three measures of skew across
the states that use the same method of judicial selection, with one table
for each judicial selection taxonomy. In particular, Table 2 uses the AJS
taxonomy, Table 3 uses the Federalist Society taxonomy, and Table 4
uses my taxonomy.
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TABLE 1: IDEOLOGICAL SKEW AMONG APPELLATE JUDGES BY STATE
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2: IDEOLOGICAL SKEw AMONG APPELLATE JUDGES BY AJS
SELECTION METHODS
R Advantage by Judicial Affiliation
Campaign Contributions, R Advantage by

(1)

Gubernatorial
Appointment
Legislative
Appointment
Merit Selection
Merit Selection:
No Bar SeatS42
Merit Selection:
Any Bar SeatS43
Merit Selection:
Bar Seats
Greater than
Zero but Fewer
than Majority44
Merit Selection:
Majority Bar
SeatS45
Nonpartisan
Election

Campaign Cont ributions
Only
(41)
(3)
(2)

Registration, and
Primary Voting

Contribution
Amount

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

2.26%

-0.19%

28.63%

4.08%
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18.360/

0.94%
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-14.48% -13.050/
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-15.52%

-8.220/

-11.30%

-12.14%
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-35.16%
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-1.46%
9.76%

-3.900 %
10.730/

-15.97% -14.600/
-7.73%

-8.580/

5.19%

-7.37%

.71%o

2
"o
-8.79%
-4.59%
I 8.%I -10.21% -6.01%
Election | -10.77% -6.57%
SOURCE: Campaign Contributions; Party Registration; Primary Voting Records; State
Election Returns; Federal Election Returns.
[Partisan

42. The states in this category are Colorado, Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New York, and Rhode Island.
43. The states in this category are Alaska (3/7 bar selected), Arizona (5/16 bar selected),
Delaware (1/9 bar selected), Florida (4/9 bar selected), Hawaii (2/9 bar selected), Indiana (3/7 bar
selected), Iowa (7/15 bar selected), Kansas (5/9 bar selected), Maryland (5/17 bar selected),
Missouri (3/7 bar selected), Nebraska (4/9 bar selected), Oklahoma (6/13 bar selected), South
Dakota (3/7 bar selected), Tennessee (12/17 bar selected), Utah (2/7 bar selected), Vermont (3/11
bar selected), and Wyoming (3/7 bar selected). See Fitzpatrick, Merit Selection, supra note 1, at
680-81.
44. The states in this category are Alaska (3/7 bar selected), Arizona (5/16 bar selected),
Delaware (1/9 bar selected), Florida (4/9 bar selected), Hawaii (2/9 bar selected), Indiana (3/7 bar
selected), Iowa (7/15 bar selected), Maryland (5/17 bar selected), Missouri (3/7 bar selected),
Nebraska (4/9 bar selected), Oklahoma (6/13 bar selected), South Dakota (3/7 bar selected), Utah
(2/7 bar selected), Vermont (3/11 bar selected), and Wyoming (3/7 bar selected). See id.
45. The states in this category are Kansas (5/9 bar selected) and Tennessee (12/17 bar
selected). See id.
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TABLE 3: IDEOLOGICAL SKEw AMONG APPELLATE JUDGES BY
FEDERALIST SOCIETY SELECTION METHODS
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2 70
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8
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SOURCE: Campaign Contributions; Party Registration; Primary Voting Records; State
Election Returns; Federal Election Returns.
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